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CASE COMMENTS
CONFLICT OF LAWS-CHOICE OF LAW- (ADHESION) CONTRACT OF
AFFREIGHTMENT WVITH STIPULATION OF APPLICABLE LA.-P and
his wife contracted with D, a British corporation, in New York, to
provide sea transportation for P and his wife. During the voyage,
P's wife was injured by the alleged negligence of D. The contract,
printed on the reverse of the ticket, provided that all claims for
injury must be brought within one year from the occurrence, and
that all questions on the contract shall be decided according to
English law. Shortly before the end of one year from the date of
the injury, D's New York agent purported to waive the period of
limitation orally. The contractual period for commencing the ac-
tion having expired, D withdrew its offer of settlement and denied
liability. This action followed. The lower court dismissed the
action, from which P appeals. Held, applying the federal choice
of law rule, one judge dissenting, that by referring to "English law"
in their contract, the parties intended to invoke only English intra-
mural (municipal) law, rather than English law of conflict of laws,
and there was no waiver or estoppel of the valid contractual period
of limitations by the actions of D's claim agent under English law.
Siegelman v. Cunard White Star, 221 F.2d 189 (2d Cir. 1955). (Note:
the issue presented under English municipal law will not be a part
of this comment.)
Since the action had been commenced in the Federal District
Court for the Southern District of New York, the first problem con-
fronting the court was whether the New York or the federal conflict
of laws rule was to be applied. As a general rule, where federal
jurisdiction is merely based on diversity of citizenship, the federal
court must apply precisely the same law which the state court
would apply. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 804 U.S. 64 (1937). But
the rule is otherwise in admiralty cases. Garrett v. Moore-Mc-
Cormack Co., 317 U.S. 239 (1942); and see Jansson v. Swedish
American Line, 185 F.2d 212, 216 (1st Cir. 1950). The courts have
consistently held that there is a general maritime law which is to
be uniformly applied. Therefore, the court's preliminary conclu-
sion that general federal maritime law, including its conflict of
laws rule, rather than New York law, is to be applied in the principal
case, seems sound.
The second problem concerned the validity of a choice of law
stipulation in a contract cutting across international boundaries, to
govern (a) its ("formal" and "essential") validity or (b) interpreta-
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tion, i.e., governing disputes arising under the contract. For the
distinction between "formal" and "essential" validity, and the dif-
ference between validity and interpretation, see DicEY, CONFLICT
OF LAWS, Rules 143-149 (Moore ed. 1896). Since the instant court
refrained from committing itself on the nature of this issue, an
insistence on the distinctions would not aid the clarity of this
comment.
There are five generally recognized theories for the determina-
tion of the law governing contracts of the instant nature. These
theories refer to: (1) the law of the place of making the contract
(lex loci contractus), (2) the law of the place of performance of
the contract (lex loci solutionis), (3) the law of the place of
greatest contact, (4) the law of the place intended by the parties,
and (5) the law of the place which supports the validity of the
contract, which is of greater theoretical than practical importance,
as to all of which see 2 RABEL, CONFLICT OF LAWS 440-484 (1947)
(hereinafter cited as RABEL). The first of these would seem to be
the soundest in view of the ease of its application and foreseeability
of result. But the rule is arbitrary and, absent agreements to the
contrary, the lex loci contractus has, therefore, generally been used
merely to determine the "'formal" validity of contracts. 2 BEALE,
CONFLICT OF LAws 1090 (1935) (hereinafter cited as BEALE). The
second is subject to the practical objection that in many cases
where the place of making and the place of performance of a
contract will differ, there will be a number of places of performance.
For this reason the third rule has been advocated, 2 RABEL 441, but
the difficulty of ascertainment is thereby merely shifted rather than
alleviated. In the principal case, the court, by giving effect to the
parties' expressed intention, adhered to the fourth theory. This
theory first found its way into the common law in the eighteenth
century, in the English case of Robinson v. Bland, 2 Burr. 1077
(1760). Mr. Beale has concluded that in this case the rule is mere
dictum, and is poor authority for the decisions which followed it.
2 BEALE 1171. However, this rule now is followed not only in
England, e.g., Jacobs v. Credit Lyonnais, 12 Q.B. 589 (1884); Trini-
dad Se. & T. Co. v. G. R. Alston & Co., [1920] A.C. 888, but also in
several American jurisdictions. 2 BEALE 1118-1174. It has been
designated as the "English rule". RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS.
W. VA. ANNOT. § 332 (1937).
The West Virginia cases reflect some of the general con-
fusion on the subject, there being decisions upholding two of the
five theories. Several cases have held that the law of the place of
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performance is to govern the validity of the contract. Pugh v'.
Cameron's A dm'r, 11 W. Va. 523 (1877), citing STORY, CONFLICT OF
LAWS §§ 241, 280 (1872); Wick v. Dawson, 42 W. Va. 43, 24 S.E.
633 (1896); and see Campen Bros. v. Stewart, 106 W. Va. 247, 249,
145 S.E. 381, 382 (1928); and Boyd v. Pancake Realty Co., 131 W.
Va. 150, 156, 46 S.E.2d 633, 636 (1948). These cases can, perhaps,
be said to be within the exception of RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 358 (1934). No case has held that a contract is governed
by the law intended by the parties. Mr. Dickinson, in RESTATEMENT,
CONFLICT OF LAWS, W. VA. ANNOT. § 332, cites Payne v. Bowlin, 6 W.
Va. 273 (1873), as standing for this proposition; however the case
would seem to uphold the rule that the contract is to be governed by
the lex loci contractus. The vast majority of West Virginia cases,
consistent with RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 332, held that
the law of the place of making (lex loci contractus) will govern the
nature, construction and validity of the contract. Boyd v. Pancake
Realty Co., supra; In re Fox, 131 W. Va. 429, 48 S.E.2d 1 (1948);
see Miller v. Prudential Banking & Trust Co., 63 W. Va. 107, 118,
59 S.E. 977, 981 (1907); and see cases collected in RESTATEMENT,
CONFLICT OF LAWS, W. VA. ANNOT. § 332. But there is no reason
to assume that the court would refuse to give effect to an agree-
ment of the parties to the contrary, provided public policy (ordre
public) is not violated by the particular nature of the agreement.
The federal cases in point are not easily reconcilable along the
lines suggested by RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 332, 358.
Both the theory of the lex loci contractus and that of the lex loci
solutionis have been favored at times. But it has always been
recognized that the parties have the power to specify the law by
which they intend their contract to be governed. See Liverpool
& Great Western Stedm Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co., 129 U.S. 397 (1889).
It follows that if the parties expressly specify that the validity of
the contract shall be governed by a different body of law, such
specification ought to be given effect.
But there are certain limitations on the parties' privilege to
stipulate the applicable law, as the court pointed out in the instant
case. The stipulation must be bona fide, citing Vita Food Products v.
Unus Shipping Co., [1939] A.C. 277. The place stipulated must have
some relationship to the contract. See Brierley v. Commercial Credit
Co., 43 F.2d 724, 730 (3d Cir. 1930). The stipulation must be one
which will neither allow the parties to do some act or fail to do
some act which would violate nor allow the parties to do some act
or fail to do some act which would evade or avoid any statute of the
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place of contracting. Seeman v. Philadelphia Warehouse Co., 274 U.
S. 403 (1928). In summary, no such provision will be given effect
where it is regarded as violative of the ordre public. The Energia, 56
Fed. 124 (S.D.N.Y. 1893); Lewisohn v. National S.S. Co., 56 Fed. 602
(E.D.N.Y. 1893); Knott v. Botany Mills, 179 U.S. 69 (1900). The ma-
jority, in the principal case, considering all the facts, found that none
of these specific rules for the protection of the ordre public had
been violated by the parties' stipulation. But the dissent was not
content with such a finding. It finds that in fact the stipulation
runs afoul of "public policy". The dissent reasons that the con-
tract being a printed form (adhesion contract), since P was not a
party to the selection of its terms, it is against public policy to
invoke the English law to defeat a claim which, under all con-
siderations of justice, is recoverable if United States law were
applied.
Having decided that the intention of the parties with regard
to the choice of law will be given effect, the court then felt itself
confronted with the question of what part of the stipulated
English law the parties intended to invoke: the entirety of English
law, including the English law of conflict of laws with its choice
of law rule, or merely English municipal law. It appears that the
court refused to run the risk of encountering a renvoi problem.
The court did so by stating its belief that the parties intended to
apply English municipal law only. As the dissent pointed out,
an English court would have interpreted the parties'- stipulation
as invoking the entire English law. Vita Food Products v. Unus
Shipping Co., supra. But, both the majority and the minority, in
the principal case, overlooked the fact that the chance of encounter-
ing a renvoi problem was nonexistent, as the English choice of law
rule, invoked by reference to the entire body of English law, would
refer the case to English municipal law under any of several
possible English theories. See Jones v. Oceanic Steam Navigation
Co., [1924] 2 K.B. 730, applying English choice of law rules with-
out hesitation. See also DIcEY, CONFLICT OF LAws 587 (Moore ed.
1896). The majority, by avoiding the renvoi question on the basis
of the parties' assumed intention, has taken a middle ground, the
other alternatives being (1) never to refer to the entirety of foreign
law, thus making it nearly impossible for renvoi situations to arise,
and (2) always to refer to the entirety of foreign law, thus inviting
renvoi problems, then to be solved by fixed rules. But the court
has made the assumed intention of the parties hinge on an assumed
desired result, and in so holding it acted without full investigation.
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The majority purported to aid the desires of the carrier, namely,
to achieve uniformity in the interpretation of its contracts. In
this case it was mere accident that application of the English
municipal law rule led to the same result which would have been
reached by the proper application of the English conflict of laws
rule. But the assumption of the carrier's desire to obtain uniform
interpretations of his contracts, coupled with the blind application
of the carrier's domestic law, is dangerous, and, in fact, on occasion
may even defeat the carrier's real intention. Under German law,
for instance, the German choice of law rule refers to the municipal
law of the place of delivery of the passenger or cargo, with the result
that German carriers obtain a uniformity of result with respect
to all goods and passengers shipped into their own ports, and con-
sistency with respect to all goods and passengers shipped into any
foreign country. If an American court were to interpret a German
contract for shipment to America, referring to the application of
German law, merely so as to refer to German municipal law,
then the intention of the German carrier-who relies on the entire
German law-would be frustrated. This points to the danger of
invoking assumptions as to the intention of the parties without
first inquiring what it is reasonable for the parties to intend. To
guide the interpreting court, it should inquire what the courts of
the contract-writing party would hold with respect to the stipulated
law. See RAAPE, INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 294 (3d ed. 1950).
Thus, parties referring to "law" may well plan on renvoi and
thereby intend to secure uniformity and consistency of result.
The decision leaves unaffected the general propositions, un-
certain as they are, governing the applicability of law where the
parties are silent. The court reaffirms -the rule that where the
parties have been circumspicious enough to stipulate the applicable
law, such stipulation will be given effect, subject to the ordre public
of the lex fori. Where the parties have failed to give a clear indi-
cation as to whether they meant to invoke the entire law (including
conflict of laws rules) or merely the municipal law of the stipulated
body of laws, the court will endeavor to ascertain the intention of
the parties. But in defining the putative intention of the parties
as it did, the court may well have erred.
H. R. A., Jr.
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